London is as cosmopolitan as New York if not more so. Tokyo would be way down the list. Bangkok would be higher if they counted 2nd gen+ Chinese but otherwise it's fairly homogeneous. Dubai would rank #1 of cities I've been to by a large margin, Toronto would be near the top as well.
Staten Island isn’t all heroin and racist cops, it also has meth and racist firefighters...To me Vancouver has always seemed more cosmopolitan, and more urbane, than Toronto. Toronto is a suburban, technocratic city: the only such I've seen that also feels human are New York and Paris which are so diverse they kind of burst all adjectives.
Money : Funk
Toronto : Vancouver
Washington : San Francisco
Milan : Rome
Vienna : Salzburg
The stereotype is:
Manhattan : Brooklyn
but TBH even the boroughs of New York are so diverse they defy those descriptions (except Staten Island which is just a nasty piece of New Jersey that got misfiled).
I’ve lived in London too. Maybe the reason I don’t think it’s as cosmo as some others is that it felt easier to divide the wealthy from the not wealthy.
I was playing around with projections of the Voyager spacecrafts trajectory and ran into this. It's one of those intersections between epistemology and ontology where I feel instinctively that the absurdity points up problems with our perception of reality.
More tangential science content
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet"><p lang="en" dir="ltr">Impressive. Almost every single word in this tweet is used incorrectly. <a href="https://t.co/ljpyZCqlcy">https://t.co/ljpyZCqlcy</a></p>— Ryan Broderick (@broderick) <a href="https://twitter.com/broderick/status/1260775583128211456?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">May 14, 2020</a></blockquote> <script async src="https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js" charset="utf-8"></script>
The Standard Model may (or may not) be about to take it in the teeth.
I am not a physicist.Ok. There are two huge headlines here assuming it plays out. One was blared from the mountaintop (Standard Model is Dead!)
The other was buried: “As a bonus, the Zʹ boson would also imply the existence of an additional massive particle that could make up the universe’s missing dark matter.”
I am not a physicist.
To me, this does not look like the beginning of the end of the standard model - just a need for further extension/refinement as has happened dozens of times in the last 50 years.
Did I mention that I'm not a physicist?
Look, all I'm saying is that you don't get to be the King for 50 years without knowing how to co-opt a few naysayers along the way. "Yeah, that's always been part of me, too!"Long live the standard model?
Look, all I'm saying is that you don't get to be the King for 50 years without knowing how to co-opt a few naysayers along the way. "Yeah, that's always been part of me, too!"
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A third line of attack offered by Leibniz against the Newtonian conception of space and time draws on another principle familiar from Leibniz’s metaphysics, namely, the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII). In the present context we may understand the PII as ruling out the possibility of two things being distinct, but not distinct in virtue of some discernible property. It thus suggests that where we cannot identify a recognizable difference between two things or possibilities, those two are in fact only one – that is, as Leibniz puts it, that “To suppose two things indiscernible, is to suppose the same thing under two names” (Fourth Paper, paragraph 6; G VII.372/Alexander 37). Armed with the PII, Leibniz argues once again that the apparent possibility of absolute space and time can be undermined. For on the supposition of absolute space, the world oriented in one way with respect to space would have to be a distinct possibility from the world oriented in another way with respect to absolute space. But, according to Leibniz, two such purported possibilities would be indiscernible since no being – not even God or an angel – could recognize any difference between them. Leibniz thus concludes that since the supposition of absolute space leads to a violation of the PII, the supposition itself must be rejected. By essentially the same reasoning, Leibniz argues similarly that the apparent possibility of absolute time is also inconsistent with the PII and so too must be rejected as chimerical or confused.