FINDINGS
Fourteen of the 20 journalists said they have used deception in their work. The rest
claimed they have not but all are aware of other journalists who have—consistent
with the contention of Price (1973), in his study of situational determinants of ethical
judgments, that people in general consider others to be less ethical than themselves.
For the journalists who confess, the “confession” comes only after an extended
conversation, demonstrating a strong Kantian perspective about deception:
it is always wrong (Kant, 1785/1993). Journalistic deception, as noted by Elliot
and Culver (1992), is a prima facie wrong. There is a clear understanding that deception
is morally wrong, even among those who believe deception is acceptable
in some situations. The journalists’ vocabulary is redolent of situational ethics—“
case-by-case,” “context,” “It depends,” and “It’s circumstantial”:
I wish I could say it [deception] should never play as a factor. But I can think that, in
reality, you or someone can come up with scenarios that were perhaps justified. In
which case, the proper answer is I would hope it can be avoided at all cost but it may
have to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
—“Bob”
