No I read what you were saying and I stand by what I said. Comfort is a relative thing. Those kind of clothes may not seem comfortable to you but to others they feel great. I'm sorry but it's archaic and horribly sexist to say that a woman can't dress a certain way unless she wants to attract attention and that they only dress that way to attract attention. JFC womens bodies are more than sex objects.If you actually read what we are talking about you would know those clothes are not comfortable. High heel shoes and tight clothing is not worn for comfort nor are push up bras and plunging necklines. Try again...
That's what I got out of it. Everyone is guilty of the occasional glance.Pretty sure Kep isn't saying an occasional glance is cause for burning it all down. That will happen.
Wait a minute, you are arguing two different things. I am not advocating that he hit on her or that people **** where they eat...I am just saying fair is fair. Looking is not harassment, and comments arent until you say to stop.
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/sexual_harassment.cfm
Now overall you could say Faux is a hostile work environment and I buy that but me looking at Sally's tight sweater is no more harassment then her looking at the shirtless construction guy fixing the parking lot. If she says "eyes up here" though then yeah you are right.
There is a difference between being creepy and sexually harassing someone in the legal sense.
People may think it's archaic and sexist, but I guarantee you that in a case like this the way the woman dresses, acts, etc..., is going to be relevant evidence as to whether the conduct was welcome or invited.No I read what you were saying and I stand by what I said. Comfort is a relative thing. Those kind of clothes may not seem comfortable to you but to others they feel great. I'm sorry but it's archaic and horribly sexist to say that a woman can't dress a certain way unless she wants to attract attention and that they only dress that way to attract attention. JFC womens bodies are more than sex objects.
"Well I thought she was dressed like a whore so I treated her like one!"People may think it's archaic and sexist, but I guarantee you that in a case like this the way the woman dresses, acts, etc..., is going to be relevant evidence as to whether the conduct was welcome or invited.
Comments can be even if you don't say stop. Generally you would need more, but to put it into context, dropping the n-word just one time could be seen as racial harassment.
People may think it's archaic and sexist, but I guarantee you that in a case like this the way the woman dresses, acts, etc..., is going to be relevant evidence as to whether the conduct was welcome or invited.
Wait a minute, you are arguing two different things. I am not advocating that he hit on her or that people **** where they eat...I am just saying fair is fair. Looking is not harassment, and comments arent until you say to stop.
People may think it's archaic and sexist, but I guarantee you that in a case like this the way the woman dresses, acts, etc..., is going to be relevant evidence as to whether the conduct was welcome or invited.
That's what I got out of it. Everyone is guilty of the occasional glance.
Petitioner contends that even if this case must be remanded to the District Court, the Court of Appeals erred in one of the terms of its remand. Specifically, the Court of Appeals stated that testimony about respondent's "dress and personal fantasies," 243 U.S. App. D.C., at 328, n. 36, 753 F.2d, at 146, n. 36, which the District Court apparently admitted [477 U.S. 57, 69] into evidence, "had no place in this litigation." Ibid. The apparent ground for this conclusion was that respondent's voluntariness vel non in submitting to Taylor's advances was immaterial to her sexual harassment claim. While "voluntariness" in the sense of consent is not a defense to such a claim, it does not follow that a complainant's sexually provocative speech or dress is irrelevant as a matter of law in determining whether he or she found particular sexual advances unwelcome. To the contrary, such evidence is obviously relevant. The EEOC Guidelines emphasize that the trier of fact must determine the existence of sexual harassment in light of "the record as a whole" and "the totality of circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred." 29 CFR 1604.11(b) (1985). Respondent's claim that any marginal relevance of the evidence in question was outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice is the sort of argument properly addressed to the District Court. In this case the District Court concluded that the evidence should be admitted, and the Court of Appeals' contrary conclusion was based upon the erroneous, categorical view that testimony about provocative dress and publicly expressed sexual fantasies "had no place in this litigation." 243 U.S. App. D.C., at 328, n. 36, 753 F.2d, at 146, n. 36. While the District Court must carefully weigh the applicable considerations in deciding whether to admit evidence of this kind, there is no per se rule against its admissibility.Case in point?
You'd be shocked at how many males are incapable of discretion.Hence the discrete ogle. Every man in the history of the world could rank order his preference of the women he works with. The vast majority of us manage to collect this information without being offensive and oafish.
You'd be shocked at how many males are incapable of discretion.
Petitioner contends that even if this case must be remanded to the District Court, the Court of Appeals erred in one of the terms of its remand. Specifically, the Court of Appeals stated that testimony about respondent's "dress and personal fantasies," 243 U.S. App. D.C., at 328, n. 36, 753 F.2d, at 146, n. 36, which the District Court apparently admitted [477 U.S. 57, 69] into evidence, "had no place in this litigation." Ibid. The apparent ground for this conclusion was that respondent's voluntariness vel non in submitting to Taylor's advances was immaterial to her sexual harassment claim. While "voluntariness" in the sense of consent is not a defense to such a claim, it does not follow that a complainant's sexually provocative speech or dress is irrelevant as a matter of law in determining whether he or she found particular sexual advances unwelcome. To the contrary, such evidence is obviously relevant. The EEOC Guidelines emphasize that the trier of fact must determine the existence of sexual harassment in light of "the record as a whole" and "the totality of circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred." 29 CFR 1604.11(b) (1985). Respondent's claim that any marginal relevance of the evidence in question was outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice is the sort of argument properly addressed to the District Court. In this case the District Court concluded that the evidence should be admitted, and the Court of Appeals' contrary conclusion was based upon the erroneous, categorical view that testimony about provocative dress and publicly expressed sexual fantasies "had no place in this litigation." 243 U.S. App. D.C., at 328, n. 36, 753 F.2d, at 146, n. 36. While the District Court must carefully weigh the applicable considerations in deciding whether to admit evidence of this kind, there is no per se rule against its admissibility.
Vinson.
Listen, I'd love to live in the same world that Mad Men portrayed on AMC.
That world doesn't exist in the United States anymore. Maybe in different countries you can get back to that level.
You just want to live in the same world as Christina Hendricks.
And I do not blame you one bit.