Kepler
Si certus es dubita
Several sources commenting that Russia elected not to take the operational pause generally associated with gearing up for a new attack, to the point where units which failed in the Kyiv attack are being redeployed immediately into the Donetsk attack:
Assuming they even backfilled them to normal strength, it would be mostly from conscripts. Insofar as they have any officers to call on they are coming from occupational zones in the Caucuses.
Basically, it's a sh-tshow. One thing they do seem to be doing this time is establishing air superiority. I haven't seen many (any?) reports of Russian air assets being yoinked the way they were in the Kyiv and Kherson attacks.
The Russian offensive in the east is unlikely to be dramatically more successful than previous Russian offensives, but Russian forces may be able to wear down Ukrainian defenders or achieve limited gains. Russian forces did not take the operational pause that was likely necessary to reconstitute and properly integrate damaged units withdrawn from northeastern Ukraine into operations in eastern Ukraine. As we have assessed previously, Russian forces withdrawn from around Kyiv and going back to fight in Donbas have, at best, been patched up and filled out with soldiers from other damaged units, and the Russian military has few, if any, cohesive units not previously deployed to Ukraine to funnel into new operations.[1] Frequent reports of disastrously low Russian morale and continuing logistics challenges indicate the effective combat power of Russian units in eastern Ukraine is a fraction of their on-paper strength in numbers of battalion tactical groups (BTGs). Russian forces may certainly be able to wear down Ukrainian positions in eastern Ukraine through the heavy concentration of firepower and sheer weight of numbers, but likely at a high cost. A sudden and dramatic Russian offensive success remains highly unlikely, however, and Ukrainian tactical losses would not spell the end of the campaign in eastern Ukraine, much less the war as a whole.
Assuming they even backfilled them to normal strength, it would be mostly from conscripts. Insofar as they have any officers to call on they are coming from occupational zones in the Caucuses.
Basically, it's a sh-tshow. One thing they do seem to be doing this time is establishing air superiority. I haven't seen many (any?) reports of Russian air assets being yoinked the way they were in the Kyiv and Kherson attacks.