US Foreign Policy 3.0: We're The Mets of International Diplomacy

[Kepler]

Not a fan of that country.

It's not Israel or Israelis, it's the Israeli Right. They are just as corrupt, depraved, and vicious as our own Right.

 

[Kepler]

I give you: every soldier, ever.

 

[Kepler]

Welcome to Kyiv.

Translation: "Death to occupiers."

 

[Kepler]

From ISW: (Who are scumbags but have been doing a great job at this analysis.)

March 11, 5:30pm EST

Russian ground forces attempting to encircle and take Kyiv began another pause to resupply and refit combat units on March 11 after failed attacks March 8-10. Russian forces also appear to be largely stalemated around Kharkiv. Russian advances from Crimea toward Mykolayiv and Zaporizhya and in the east around Donetsk and Luhansk made no progress in the last 24 hours, and Russian forces in the south face growing morale and supply issues. The Ukrainian General Staff asserted Russia has so far failed to take its territorial objectives for the war and will likely increasingly turn to strikes on civilian targets and psychological operations to undermine civilian support for the Ukrainian government.[1] Uncoordinated and sporadic Russian offensive operations against major Ukrainian cities support the Ukrainian General Staff’s assessment that Russian forces face growing morale and supply issues and have lost the initiative. The Ukrainian General Staff stated on March 11 that Ukrainian forces are “actively defending and conducting successful counterattacks in all directions,” but did not state where reported counterattacks are occurring.[2]

The Kremlin likely seeks to increase its combat power by drawing Belarus into the war and leveraging Syrian proxies, in addition to ongoing efforts to directly replace Russian combat losses through individual conscripts that are unlikely to be well-enough trained or motivated to generate effective new combat power. Putin is reportedly conducting an internal purge of general offers and intelligence personnel and recalibrating Russia’s war effort to sustain combat operations far longer than the Kremlin initially planned. Russia likely requires a new wave of combat-effective reservists or recruits in a short period of time to achieve its objectives in Ukraine but is unlikely to be able to generate such a wave. Russian aircraft likely conducted an attempted false-flag attack on Belarusian territory on March 11. The Kremlin is likely pressuring Belarus to enter the war in Ukraine to support Russian forces, though Belarusian President Lukashenko is likely attempting to delay or prevent his entry into the war to avoid costly Western sanctions and Belarusian combat losses. The Kremlin additionally announced plans on March 11 to deploy foreign fighters, including up to 16,000 Syrian fighters, to Ukraine. The Kremlin is highly unlikely to abandon its continuing main effort to encircle and capture Kyiv and will continue to feed replacements and reinforcements into this operation.

Key Takeaways

• Russian operations around Kyiv remained largely stalled over the past 24 hours and Russian forces conducted another pause to resupply and refit frontline units.
• Russian forces did not secure any new territory in northeastern Ukraine and may be redeploying forces attacking eastern Kyiv to defend against Ukrainian counterattacks in Sumy Oblast.
• Russian forces remain pinned down attempting to reduce Mariupol by siege and bombardment.
• Ukrainian forces halted Russian advances north and west from Crimea as Russian forces face growing supply and morale issues.
• Russian aircraft likely conducted an attempted false-flag attack on Belarusian territory on March 11 in an effort to draw Belarus into the war.
• The Kremlin announced plans to deploy foreign fighters, including up to 16,000 Syrian fighters, to Ukraine.
• Putin reportedly fired several generals and arrested FSB intelligence officers in an internal purge.
• Ukrainian forces killed the commander of Russia’s 29th Combined Arms Army. High casualties among Russian general officers indicate the poor quality of Russian command and control, requiring Russian generals to deploy forward and risk Ukrainian fire to command their forces.
• Ukrainian air force and air defense operations continue to hinder Russian ground forces maneuver by likely limiting Russian close air support and exposing Russian mechanized forces to Ukrainian air and artillery attacks.

 

[rufus]

From what I read, those Russian moves towards Kyiv were small groups of 2-300 men. That they have had to pause so quickly after those small attacks to reorganize and resupply is telling.

 

[Kepler]

Official Ukrainian government Twitter:

 

[Steffek]

From what I read, those Russian moves towards Kyiv were small groups of 2-300 men. That they have had to pause so quickly after those small attacks to reorganize and resupply is telling.

With units that small, Russia was likely attempting probing maneuvers more so than any attack. They almost certainly found strong resistance and hightailed it out of there.
Russia still needs to take a few outskirt areas before any real attack on Kyiv begins. If/when they do, it will suffer the same fate as Mariupol. Russia will bombard the crap out of Kyiv while sitting in the outskirts.

One thing's for sure, the Russian military is stretched to the max right now. Time is not on their side. This is encouraging yet horrifying considering what Putin is capable of when backed into a corner.

 

[rufus]

Right. But even small unit maneuvers like that taxed them so severely they had to pull back and reorganize and resupply.

 

[Wayuphere]

I don’t buy the Russia can’t bury the Ukraine
talk. I truly believe there is more up Putins sleeve then the current display of inaptitude. Why isn’t he filling the skies over Ukraine with his bombers and fighters if he quickly wants to destroy the country? His ground forces and Air Force are still mostly in Russia.
The talk of him being out maneuvered scares me, as I think there is more to this then bad military strategy. He’s evil, expect an evil surprise….NATO better have both eyes wide open. I smell a rope-a-dope.

 

[Deutsche Gopher Fan]

Sound like a middle has struck us base in erbil

 

[dxmnkd316]

I don’t buy the Russia can’t bury the Ukraine
talk. I truly believe there is more up Putins sleeve then the current display of inaptitude. Why isn’t he filling the skies over Ukraine with his bombers and fighters if he quickly wants to destroy the country? His ground forces and Air Force are still mostly in Russia.
The talk of him being out maneuvered scares me, as I think there is more to this then bad military strategy. He’s evil, expect an evil surprise….NATO better have both eyes wide open. I smell a rope-a-dope.

I don't think NATO is going to be caught off guard

 

[BassAle]

Couple things:

1. It's true the power has been out two days and the data feeds cut out last night, meaning nobody can tell what's going on there anymore.

2. However, I've seen videos of IAEA guys saying it takes 9 years for the particular fuel rods (?) that were left at site to become neutralized and they have been buried under concrete for over 20. They said even if the cooling ponds completely evaporated there would be no significant increase in radioactivity.

3. I know nothing! Reporting what I heard.

The last reactor at Chernobyl (or Chornobyl as the Ukranians would prefer we spelled it) was decommissioned in 2000. The fuel rods need to be cooled in water for several years after they come out of the reactor, after 2-4 years they should be cool enough to move to dry casks and cool with convection cooling. They haven't moved all the rods to dry storage yet (so they're not in concrete casks) -- they started doing that a couple years ago. There isn't enough decay heat now to boil off the water. It's not ideal, but it's not like the rods are in danger of melting down from loss of cooling.

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/09/c...er-outage.html

The heat load of the spent fuel storage pool and the volume of cooling water contained in the pool is sufficient to maintain effective heat removal without the need for electrical supply

 

[Kepler]

I don’t buy the Russia can’t bury the Ukraine
talk. I truly believe there is more up Putins sleeve then the current display of inaptitude. Why isn’t he filling the skies over Ukraine with his bombers and fighters if he quickly wants to destroy the country? His ground forces and Air Force are still mostly in Russia.

Because he has the mindset that NATO wants to invade Russia, so all the good hardware is back home waiting to defend.

 

[Kepler]

Sound like a middle has struck us base in erbil

Not wonderful.

 

[Deutsche Gopher Fan]

Not wonderful.

Remember when alpha male Donnie didn’t do shit about this back in 2020

 

[Steffek]

Right. But even small unit maneuvers like that taxed them so severely they had to pull back and reorganize and resupply.

Agree totally. Like I said, the Russians are stretched thin. But keep in mind Russia's forces around Kyiv (and mainly in the North) are mainly conscrpts with crappy equipment and command/control. The Northern front is where the Russians are making fools of themselves.
This is sort of by design though. It's these guys who will serve as cannon fodder once it's time to go into Kyiv. The sacrificial first few waves.

The Southern front is more telling, imo. It's where both country's better trained and better equipped forces are, including Ukraine's battle-hardened territorial defense batallions. And apart from a few hiccups, the Russians are pushing them around. Kherson has already fallen and Mariupol is about to fall any day now.


I dunno. I think our own propaganda machine has gives people some false hope with constant images of Russian casualties and abandoned/destroyed equipment.
Not that is hasn't been a clusterfunk in a lot of ways, but I think crap is gonna hit the fan once those Southern forces start pushing north after Mariupol falls. The South was a priority for Putin. They needed that land link between Russia and Crimea, and it also gives them control over the entire Azov Sea.
That said, Russia has a small window to achieve this. They can't sustain this current level forever.

 

[Kepler]

Detailed update from ISW:

The Ukrainian military claimed to have damaged or destroyed 31 Russian BTGs as of March 11, its first numbered claim of damage to Russian forces of the war. Ukrainian military intelligence reported at 6:00 am local time on March 12 that Ukrainian forces have destroyed 13 Russian BTGs and rendered 18 BTGs combat ineffective as of March 11.[1] US intelligence estimated Russia deployed approximately 120 BTGs to Ukraine’s borders prior to February 24.[2] The Ukrainian military has not previously made any official statements on numbers of destroyed Russian BTGs. The Ukrainian General Staff continues to report widespread Russian logistics and morale issues, stating on March 12 that Russia “was forced to change tactics” due to unsuccessful attempts to conduct an offensive, that Russian units continue to abandon equipment, and that the rate of Russian desertions and surrenders to Ukrainian forces is increasing.[3] The General Staff additionally stated that Russia is calling up conscripts from the DNR and LNR, mercenaries from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Russian convicted prisoners to offset heavy combat losses and reserve problems.[4] The Ukrainian Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) reported on March 12 that Russian commanders authorized their soldiers to loot civilian businesses and households and move to ”self sufficiency” to offset continued supply problems.[5]

Ukraine updated its previous report that Russian aircraft bombed the Belarusian town of Kopani on March 11 in a likely false-flag attack, adding that Russian aircraft also bombed Bukhlichi and Verkhny Terebezh.[6]The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian and Belarusian forces have not conducted any military operations toward western Ukraine but that Minsk is “taking measures to strengthen the protection of the border with Ukraine” and Ukraine cannot rule out Belarus entering the war.[7]

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov claimed that Russia will view Western military aid shipments to Ukraine as legitimate military targets on March 12.[8]Ryabkov claimed Russia previously warned the United States that ”pumping Ukraine with weapons” is dangerous and makes the arms shipments military targets. Ryabkov reiterated Kremlin claims that the United States provoked the war in Ukraine by supplying Ukraine with weapons. The Kremlin likely seeks to deter continuing Western military aid to Ukraine by threatening to target arms shipments, though Russian forces have so far conducted relatively few air and missile strikes in western Ukraine to date and would likely face strong Ukrainian air defenses.

Russian forces are engaged in four primary efforts at this time:

• Main effort—Kyiv (comprised of three subordinate supporting efforts);
• Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv;
  • Supporting effort 1a—Luhansk Oblast;
• Supporting effort 2—Mariupol and Donetsk Oblast; and
• Supporting effort 3—Kherson and advances westward.

Main effort—Kyiv axis: Russian operations on the Kyiv axis are aimed at encircling the city from the northwest, west, and east.

Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations northwest of Kyiv in the past 24 hours. Russian forces made limited advances around Chernihiv and toward Kyiv’s eastern outskirts after pausing for several days. Continued Ukrainian counterattacks and successful operations by Territorial Defense Forces continue to threaten Russia’s long line of communication in northeastern Ukraine.

Subordinate main effort along the west bank of the Dnipro

Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations northwest of Kyiv for the second day in a row.[9] The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian forces continued to regroup and replenish reserves. Russian forces continue to shell Kyiv’s northwestern suburbs but did not launch any ground attacks on March 11-12.[10] Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian loitering munitions-equipped unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) over downtown Kyiv on March 12, the first Russian use of armed UAVs in Ukraine that ISW has observed.[11] Russian forces are likely deploying new assets to the western Kyiv front as part of ongoing resupply and replenishment efforts.

Subordinate supporting effort—Chernihiv axis

Russian forces resumed limited attacks toward northeastern Kyiv on March 12. The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian forces attacked toward Zazymya (northwest of Brovary) and Vyshenky with unspecified “partial success.”[12] Russian forces attacked toward Mykhailo-Kotsyubynske and Shestovytsia, roughly 15km west and southwest of Chernihiv, in a likely effort to fully encircle the city.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported the deployment of Russian bridging equipment in Mykhailo-Kotsyubynske, Levkovychi, Zhukotka, and Hrodnya, around Chernihiv.[14] Russian forces may be preparing for an operation to cross the Desna River from west to east to further surround Chernihiv.

Subordinate supporting effort—Sumy axis

Russian forces continued to reinforce the Sumy axis on March 12 and did not launch new ground offensives.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff reported at midnight local time on March 11 that Russian forces are shifting reserves in Velyka Pysarivka, Moskovsky Bobryak, and Lebedyn – several towns along Russia’s exposed ground line of communication in northeastern Ukraine.[16] Ukrainian territorial defense forces additionally conducted at least two successful attacks near Sumy on March 11, destroying and capturing several Russian tanks and artillery vehicles.[17] ISW previously assessed that continuing Ukrainian counterattacks in northeastern Ukraine would force Russia to redeploy forces to consolidate this long line of communication.[18]

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv:

Russian forces captured unspecified northern portions of Izyum, 110km southeast of Kharkiv, on March 12.[19] Russian forces additionally launched an unsuccessful attack on Rubizhne, south of Kharkiv.[20] Russian forces continued to shell Kharkiv but did not conduct any major ground attacks on March 12.[21] Russian forces likely seek to bypass Kharkiv from the southeast and advance toward Dnipro and Zaporizhya, but are unlikely to make substantial advances without committing further combat power.

Supporting Effort #1a—Luhansk Oblast:

The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian forces concentrated additional reserves in Severodonetsk and Svatove but did not conduct any offensive operations in the past 24 hours.[22]

Supporting Effort #2—Mariupol and Donetsk Oblast:

The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed Russian forces captured the “eastern outskirts” of Mariupol on March 12 but did not provide further details.[23] Ukrainian forces reported repelling a Russian offensive toward Krasna Polyana and Olhynka – two towns north of Mariupol which Russian forces previously claimed to have already captured – as of noon local time on March 12.[24] Russian forces are unlikely to seize Mariupol through a direct assault without a greater concentration of forces (which they remain unlikely to have the ability to assemble). Russia will likely continue to shell the city and maintain gradual ground assaults to force the city to capitulate.

Supporting Effort #3—Kherson and west:

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted a new advance northeast from Kherson along the western bank of the Dnipro on March 12, deploying artillery and air defense assets to Mylove.[25] Russian forces have not yet conducted attacks at strength along the west bank of the Dnipro on the southern axis of advance. Russian forces may intend to advance northeast to encircle Zaporizhya, but are unlikely to have the forces necessary to do so while Russian forces in the south remain committed to the encirclement of Mariupol. Russian forces directly south of Zaporizhya conducted limited advances on March 12, capturing Stepove and Shcherbaky (approximately 40km south of Zaporizhya).[26]

Russian forces did not conduct any new attacks toward Mykolayiv on March 12 and reinforced their existing positions.[27] Russian forces are unlikely to resume major offensive operations toward Odesa in the next 48-72 hours.

Immediate items to watch

• The Kremlin likely seeks to pressure Belarus to join the war in Ukraine and will deploy Syrian fighters to Ukraine in the near future;
• Ukrainian counterattacks and operations by Territorial Defense Forces in northeastern Ukraine threaten Russia’s exposed line of communication, requiring Russia to redeploy forces away from the offensive toward eastern Kyiv;
• Russian forces are undertaking another operational pause to prepare for renewed efforts to encircle Kyiv from east and west and/or to seize the city center itself following their failures of March 8-9;
• Russian troops may drive on Zaporizhya City itself within the next 48-72 hours, likely to try and block it on both banks of the Dnipro River and set conditions for subsequent operations after Russian forces take Mariupol, which they are currently besieging.

 

[Kepler]

Gilles Deleuze said it all about Putin's dream.

 

[Kepler]

Also works with Republican messaging:

 

[aparch]

A memo went out to Russian State TV staff that Tucker Carlson is to be played more on state TV because it shows how he's the Russian voice of western media.

Chinese State TV has also started airing more Tucker clips thanks to his efforts in discrediting China as being the source of Covid.


And Q Anon has jumped into the game, by claiming Covid came from Chyna, Ukraine; and Trump was trying to tell us all along. https://twitter.com/marcowenjones/status/1502993129481424902