Iran So Far Away: 2026

[ticapnews]

Nothing bad can happen. Only good can happen.

 

[ticapnews]

Genocide? What genocide?

View attachment 2564

That post violated Twitter's standards. This is news to me because I wasn't aware that Twitter had standards anymore.

 

[FadeToBlack&Gold]

Good grief, what a pro-fascist cesspool Xitter became.

 

[ticapnews]

So the peace process is going great....

 

[Kepler]

Time for Dump to FAFO again.

 

[ticapnews]

The child rapist war criminal deftly utilizing every ounce of diplomacy and that vaunted business acumen.



Much, much more at link

 

[aparch]

Apparently during talks today, the Iranian diplomats walked out after Donnie posted some bullshit to Truth Social, and the delegate from Qatar completely ignored Vance while greeting other delegates mere feet from Vance.

 

[ticapnews]

 

[ticapnews]

The Daily Show
"Iran is a circumcision away from being Israel."

 

[Kepler]

Logging in to a classified system using someone else's login credentials is, you will not be surprised to learn, an extremely serious security violation both for the person doing it and the person's whose userid and password was used. If an accident, it is how you wind up with dozens of hours of mandatory retraining before you are permitted back on any classified system. If deliberate, it is how you lose your job and clearance and perhaps get legal action started against you.

 

[ticapnews]

Logging in to a classified system using someone else's login credentials is, you will not be surprised to learn, an extremely serious security violation both for the person doing it and the person's whose userid and password was used. If an accident, it is how you wind up with dozens of hours of mandatory retraining before you are permitted back on any classified system. If deliberate, it is how you lose your job and clearance and perhaps get legal action started against you.

But I imagine having someone representing a foreign government watch you enter said credentials and then read your screen is A-OK, right?

 

[FadeToBlack&Gold]

Logging in to a classified system using someone else's login credentials is, you will not be surprised to learn, an extremely serious security violation both for the person doing it and the person's whose userid and password was used. If an accident, it is how you wind up with dozens of hours of mandatory retraining before you are permitted back on any classified system. If deliberate, it is how you lose your job and clearance and perhaps get legal action started against you.

FAKE NEWS doctored photo! Surely a former Marine and VPOTUS would never allow a foreign national to shoulder surf while he logs into classified systems using someone else's DoD ID!

If they say anything at all, I'm sure the regime will just say that he wasn't on a classified network or accessing classified systems at the time. Still wouldn't explain why he's using someone else's ID, unless it's cool for an employee to just pass VPOTUS their laptop whenever he has a need to know something.

 

[Kepler]

But I imagine having someone representing a foreign government watch you enter said credentials and then read your screen is A-OK, right?

Honest answer: it depends on their clearance.

First, nobody is ever permitted to watch somebody else enter a password since that kinda destroys the whole idea of a password.

Now then, the foreign representative almost certainly does not have Industrial Security Staff Approval (ISSA) clearance. That is "staff-like" access to a classified system, which amounts to you having the right to an account and the ability to log in to it -- the right to having your hands on the keyboard. ISSA is controlled as part of the clearance and classification regime. I for example had ISSA clearance on most USG TS/SCI (Sensitive Compartmentalized Information) networks for > 20 years. Even with ISSA you still must have need to know to access a particular Controlled Access Program (CAP). The automated access control system on the system gives or denies you access based on your userid. You can't break it by accident. If you break it by means of counter-measures, which is possible, you go to Leavenworth.

However, if the foreign representative has the lesser Industrial Security Approval (ISA) clearance for that system, then they ARE in fact permitted to look over the shoulder of an ISSA person with an account. It is up to the recognizance of the ISSA holder to use their judgment as to whether the ISA holder can see the data. It's counter-intuitive, but it's allowed. And indeed it is the way a foreign head of state, diplomat or technical expert is permitted to view data on a TS system. The ISSA person is never permitted to, for example, print out the data and then give it to the ISA holder. That creates a data spill, since the new holder could then theoretically spread the document further. Verbotten.

You may be hankering to point out that nothing prevents the ISA holder from retaining the information they've been shown in their head and telling somebody bad later. ISA is also limited to TS clearance holders. But yes, point taken. It's an art, and it's fraught. We've been doing INFOSEC for about 80 years and it's still a work in progress.

Bottom line: if what we see in the photo is real, it's a very serious security violation. Even if Vance has the same or even higher access than the person whose userid is being used, it does not matter. You may NEVER touch a system logged in as somebody else. You're literally not permitted to call for help in a medical emergency on somebody else's system; you must use other means. It's the only exception to the medical waiver I'm aware of. When somebody is having a heart attack, every other security measure is temporarily suspended. That's why firemen are allowed to put out fires and EMTs are allowed to enter facilities without having their IDs checked.

It is fun to talk about something I know about rather than pull it from my ass. For once.

Note everything above is unclassified and publicly available. As lax as I am on all other moral, ethical, and spiritual rules, I have seen enough intel over the years to treat classification as non-negotiably serious.

Thar be monsters.

 

[rufus]

All sanctions on Iran lifted.

 

[beaverhockeyfan]

All sanctions on Iran lifted.

And here I thought this administration was going to punish them.....

 

[Russell Jaslow]

Honest answer: it depends on their clearance.

First, nobody is ever permitted to watch somebody else enter a password since that kinda destroys the whole idea of a password.

Now then, the foreign representative almost certainly does not have Industrial Security Staff Approval (ISSA) clearance. That is "staff-like" access to a classified system, which amounts to you having the right to an account and the ability to log in to it -- the right to having your hands on the keyboard. ISSA is controlled as part of the clearance and classification regime. I for example had ISSA clearance on most USG TS/SCI (Sensitive Compartmentalized Information) networks for > 20 years. Even with ISSA you still must have need to know to access a particular Controlled Access Program (CAP). The automated access control system on the system gives or denies you access based on your userid. You can't break it by accident. If you break it by means of counter-measures, which is possible, you go to Leavenworth.

However, if the foreign representative has the lesser Industrial Security Approval (ISA) clearance for that system, then they ARE in fact permitted to look over the shoulder of an ISSA person with an account. It is up to the recognizance of the ISSA holder to use their judgment as to whether the ISA holder can see the data. It's counter-intuitive, but it's allowed. And indeed it is the way a foreign head of state, diplomat or technical expert is permitted to view data on a TS system. The ISSA person is never permitted to, for example, print out the data and then give it to the ISA holder. That creates a data spill, since the new holder could then theoretically spread the document further. Verbotten.

You may be hankering to point out that nothing prevents the ISA holder from retaining the information they've been shown in their head and telling somebody bad later. ISA is also limited to TS clearance holders. But yes, point taken. It's an art, and it's fraught. We've been doing INFOSEC for about 80 years and it's still a work in progress.

Bottom line: if what we see in the photo is real, it's a very serious security violation. Even if Vance has the same or even higher access than the person whose userid is being used, it does not matter. You may NEVER touch a system logged in as somebody else. You're literally not permitted to call for help in a medical emergency on somebody else's system; you must use other means. It's the only exception to the medical waiver I'm aware of. When somebody is having a heart attack, every other security measure is temporarily suspended. That's why firemen are allowed to put out fires and EMTs are allowed to enter facilities without having their IDs checked.

It is fun to talk about something I know about rather than pull it from my ass. For once.

Note everything above is unclassified and publicly available. As lax as I am on all other moral, ethical, and spiritual rules, I have seen enough intel over the years to treat classification as non-negotiably serious.

Thar be monsters.

Two things about this, since I've worked like Kepler for a chunk of my career.

Kep does mention need to know. I want to emphasize this. Even if two people have all the proper clearances for the same project and are indeed working on the same project, it does not mean they both can see the same thing. The only thing you can see, clearance or not, is if you have a need to know. If your part of the project does not have a need to know the other person's part of a project, you are not allowed to see it or even talk about it.

To expand on one point of Kep's explanation of when a foreigner can see something. There are certain agreements among nations, such as Five Eyes, which allows certain countries to see certain (if marked properly) classified information without needing anything else (other than the same clearance level). Except of course, the need to know provision still holds firm.

And to joke about Kep's last paragraph. A co-worker/friend of mine once said, "I heard the Federal prison system is the most efficient and best run prison system in the country. But I still don't want to experience it."