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US Foreign Policy 3.0: We're The Mets of International Diplomacy

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How many KIA? Casualties include wounded.

Modern weapons are very efficient. Russia is finding out that they are outclassed when facing our stuff in the field of battle.

Should I be buying armaments stock? We have to replenish the larder.

I think it's also that Russia uses a lot of tanks that weren't built for javelins. They get hit and no one survives because the entire complement sits on top of the tank shells. The whole thing just explodes. So instead of losing one, maybe two, or some combo of injured and killed, everyone dies.

It's just a monumentally bad design.
 
I think it's also that Russia uses a lot of tanks that weren't built for javelins. They get hit and no one survives because the entire complement sits on top of the tank shells. The whole thing just explodes. So instead of losing one, maybe two, or some combo of injured and killed, everyone dies.

It's just a monumentally bad design.

Today it is, when it was designed, it wasn't.
 
It's just a monumentally bad design.

ls6aJ1.gif
 
Today it is, when it was designed, it wasn't.

I mean yes and no. Even when I was interviewing with NAVAIR, they were trying to forecast out 50-100 years for war capabilities. How much does a jet weigh in 2057? Will it have a pilot? Minimum takeoff speed? Etc. Impossible, but important. they need to know what tech to develop to defend against and defeat unknown weapons and equipment.

like, I feel an important question about a tank's armor is, "what happens when it's penetrated?" Everyone dying should be near the bottom of the list. ;-)
 
I mean yes and no. Even when I was interviewing with NAVAIR, they were trying to forecast out 50-100 years for war capabilities. How much does a jet weigh in 2057? Will it have a pilot? Minimum takeoff speed? Etc. Impossible, but important. they need to know what tech to develop to defend against and defeat unknown weapons and equipment.

like, I feel an important question about a tank's armor is, "what happens when it's penetrated?" Everyone dying should be near the bottom of the list. ;-)

Assuming you are talking the T62- which is the old tank that is being put back into service- that came out in 1961. Back when huge massive tank battles, where the one with the most tanks would most likely win- since that worked like a charm just 16 years before that. At the beginning of Barbarossa, the Soviets had a pretty significant tank tech advantage- just had no idea how to use it. By the end of the war, the Germans had it in spades. But the mass of numbers the Soviets brought won. So I still don't see that it was a massive design flaw back in '61. How could one project that computers would get so small and good so fast that a directed handheld missile could be directed just at the weak point in '61? The first microchip was only 3 years old then.

Sure, in hindsight, we now know of Mohrs law, and hardened microchips ended up pretty easy. But in the Soviet world just prior to '61, when the tank was designed? Sorry, I don't see many people being able to see the future of the microchip and its impact on weapons, let alone the soviets.
 
Assuming you are talking the T62- which is the old tank that is being put back into service- that came out in 1961. Back when huge massive tank battles, where the one with the most tanks would most likely win- since that worked like a charm just 16 years before that. At the beginning of Barbarossa, the Soviets had a pretty significant tank tech advantage- just had no idea how to use it. By the end of the war, the Germans had it in spades. But the mass of numbers the Soviets brought won. So I still don't see that it was a massive design flaw back in '61. How could one project that computers would get so small and good so fast that a directed handheld missile could be directed just at the weak point in '61? The first microchip was only 3 years old then.

Sure, in hindsight, we now know of Mohrs law, and hardened microchips ended up pretty easy. But in the Soviet world just prior to '61, when the tank was designed? Sorry, I don't see many people being able to see the future of the microchip and its impact on weapons, let alone the soviets.

I saw an applicable meme the other day:

2022 is as far away from 1970 as 1970 was from 1918.

A lot has certainly changed.
 
I saw an applicable meme the other day:

2022 is as far away from 1970 as 1970 was from 1918.

A lot has certainly changed.

My Mom's birthday is equidistant between 2022 and 1829. Jean-Baptiste Lamarck was still alive.

The broad will bury us all.
 
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Assuming you are talking the T62- which is the old tank that is being put back into service- that came out in 1961. Back when huge massive tank battles, where the one with the most tanks would most likely win- since that worked like a charm just 16 years before that. At the beginning of Barbarossa, the Soviets had a pretty significant tank tech advantage- just had no idea how to use it. By the end of the war, the Germans had it in spades. But the mass of numbers the Soviets brought won. So I still don't see that it was a massive design flaw back in '61. How could one project that computers would get so small and good so fast that a directed handheld missile could be directed just at the weak point in '61? The first microchip was only 3 years old then.

Sure, in hindsight, we now know of Mohrs law, and hardened microchips ended up pretty easy. But in the Soviet world just prior to '61, when the tank was designed? Sorry, I don't see many people being able to see the future of the microchip and its impact on weapons, let alone the soviets.

T72. Pretty sure the design flaw isn't present in any of the other major powers' main battle tanks.

how could anyone predict any of the major advancements in war machines? That's what differentiates superpowers from regional powers.
 
T72. Pretty sure the design flaw isn't present in any of the other major powers' main battle tanks.

how could anyone predict any of the major advancements in war machines? That's what differentiates superpowers from regional powers.

Ok- the T62 was the one being recently drawn from junk yards. They are going deep.
 
Pretty sure I read somewhere early in the war that the design flaw is there because the Russians wanted to eliminate one crew member, and so use an automated loading system for their munitions. For that system to work, the munitions need to be stored in the same compartment as the crew.

Most other tank designs have a fourth crew member to load the main gun, and there's an anti-ballistic partition between the crew and the munitions compartment.
 
I believe NATO is only really concerned about the T-14, of which there are like 10 and half of which are display models for parades.
 
I believe NATO is only really concerned about the T-14, of which there are like 10 and half of which are display models for parades.

You can use this to describe almost any of their military "advances" over the last few decades. The T14 and SU-57 have a handful actually mobile and I don't think any in actual combat roles. The SU-75 is still a clay model. The MIG 41 is still a CAD design. Their supply of hypersonic missiles ran out rather abruptly in like April.


Russia can inflict untold death and destruction, but it sure isn't due to their modern technology.
 
Huh.

Western and Russian reports of fractures within the Kremlin are gaining traction within the Russian information space, undermining the appearance of stability of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime. The Washington Post reported that US intelligence obtained information that a member of Putin’s inner circle directly criticized Putin’s “extensive military shortcomings” during the war in Ukraine, and other Western and Kremlin-affiliated officials noted rising criticism of Putin’s mishandling of the war and mobilization.[1] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov acknowledged that there have been debates in the Kremlin regarding mobilization in a statement to The Washington Post but denied all allegations of a member of the Kremlin confronting Putin. ISW cannot verify any of these reports are real or assess the likelihood that these arguments or fractures will change Putin’s mind about continuing the war, let alone if they will destabilize his regime. Word of fractures within Putin’s inner circle have reached the hyper-patriotic and nationalist milblogger crowd, however, undermining the impression of strength and control that Putin has sought to portray throughout his reign.

Some Russian milbloggers have begun speculating that there are two factions within the Kremlin following Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov and Wagner Private Military Company financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s harsh criticism of the Russian higher military command.[2] A milblogger told his nearly one million readers that Kadyrov and Prigozhin are part of the faction that seeks to continue the war and accomplish its ideological goals regardless of cost. The milblogger noted that the faction opposed to them consisted of government officials who wish to negotiate with the West to save their assets and residences in the West but are too afraid to confront Putin directly. The milblogger expressed hope that the pro-war faction will defeat the faction that fails to see that Russia cannot afford to end the war.

The presentation of fundamental disagreements within Putin’s inner circle and challenges to his decisions, even if quiet, within the Russian nationalist space risks depicting Putin as weak and not fully in control of his government. The truth or falseness of that presentation is less important than its injection into the audiences on which Putin most relies for continued support in his war. Putin himself may have externalized his own concerns about this break in the fa?ade of his power and of the unanimity of his trusted senior officials in an odd exchange with a teacher on October 5.[3] Putin asked the teacher how he taught his students about the causes of the Pugachev Rebellion that challenged Catherine the Great in the mid-1770s.[4] The teacher, from Izhevsk, one of the towns that Pugachev captured during his revolt, offered answers that did not satisfy Putin, including the observation that the rebellion had occurred because of the appearance of “a leader who could capitalize on a wave of dissatisfaction,” and that the lesson to be drawn from that episode of history was “that it is necessary to respect the views of other members of society.” Putin offered his own answer: “The leader [Pugachev] claimed to be tsar. And how did that arise? Why was that possible?...Because of the element of weakening of the central power.”[5] The exchange was bizarre and fascinating since there is no reason Pugachev’s Rebellion should have been on Putin’s mind at this time, nor any reason for him to worry about someone else “claiming to be tsar.”—unless, of course, Putin himself perceives a weakening of the central power, i.e., himself.[6]
 
Ukraine signed a decree recognizing the Kuril Islands as Japanese territory.

On another note, Japan reopened their Embassy in Kyiv.
 
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