"The NCAA, in short, 'exists primarily to enhance the contribution made by amateur athletic competition to the process of higher education as distinguished from realizing maximum return on it as an entertainment commodity.' Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women v. NCAA, 558 F.Supp. 487, 494 (DC 1983), a*******, 236 U.S.App.D.C. 311, 735 F.2d 577 (1984). One clear effect of most, if not all, of these [NCAA] regulations is to prevent institutions with competitively and economically successful programs from taking advantage of their success by expanding their programs, improving the quality of the product they offer, and increasing their sports revenues. Yet each of these regulations represents a desirable and legitimate attempt 'to keep university athletics from becoming professionalized to the extent that profit making objectives would overshadow educational objectives.' Kupec v. Atlantic Coast Conference, 399 F.Supp. 1377, 1380 (MDNC 1975).
Broadly read, these statements suggest that noneconomic values like the promotion of amateurism and fundamental educational objectives could not save the television plan from condemnation under the Sherman Act. But these statements were made in response to 'public interest' justifications proffered in defense of a ban on competitive bidding imposed by practitioners engaged in standard, profit-motivated commercial activities. The primarily noneconomic values pursued by educational institutions differ fundamentally from the 'overriding commercial purpose of the day-to-day activities' of engineers, lawyers, doctors, and businessmen, Gulland, Byrne, & Steinbach, Intercollegiate Athletics and Television Contracts: Beyond Economic Justifications in Antitrust Analysis of Agreements Among Colleges, 52 Ford.L.Rev. 717, 728 (1984), and neither Professional Engineers nor any other decision of this Court suggests that associations of nonprofit educational institutions must defend their self-regulatory restraints solely in terms of their competitive impact, without regard for the legitimate noneconomic values they promote.
Although the NCAA does attempt vigorously to enforce these restrictions, the vast potential for abuse suggests that measures, like the television plan, designed to limit the rewards of professionalism are fully consistent with, and essential to the attainment of, the NCAA's objectives. In short, "the restraints upon Oklahoma and Georgia and other colleges and universities with excellent football programs insure that they confine those programs within the principles of amateurism so that intercollegiate athletics supplement, rather than inhibit, educational achievement." 707 F.2d, at 1167 (Barrett, J., dissenting). The collateral consequences of the spreading of regional and national appearances among a number of schools are many: the television plan, like the ban on compensating student-athletes, may well encourage students to choose their schools, at least in part, on the basis of educational quality by reducing the perceived economic element of the choice, see Note, 87 Yale L.J., at 676, n. 106; it helps ensure the economic viability of athletic programs at a wide variety of schools with weaker football teams; and it "promotes competitive football among many and varied amateur teams nationwide." Gulland, Byrne, & Steinbach, supra, at 722 (footnote omitted). These important contributions, I believe, are sufficient to offset any minimal anticompetitive effects (violation of the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts) of the television plan. For all of these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals."
